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EXPERT TESTIMONY
Experience has shown that opposite opinions of persons professing to be experts may be obtained to any amount. There is
no hypothesis, however novel, but what for a substantial fee per
diem some one expert will be found to defend it under oath. As
a result expert testimony often is entitled to such weight only as a
sound and cautious criterion would award to the testimony of one
retained on a particular side, not speaking to facts as other witnesses do, but to uphold a theory favorable to his employer. It
is patent therefore, that much time is wasted in cross-examination
to discredit the witness as well as his opinion, this evil varying in
degree as the lack of integrity of the expert or the novelty of
the theory sought to be upheld draws forth the challenge of opposing counsel.
In this issue we present an appeal by a high-minded physician
who keenly feels the stigma of disrepute into which medical testimony apparently has fallen along with that of other kinds of expert
testimony. In his article the writer points out the characteristic
difficulties to be overcome by the medical expert. Many members
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of the bar quite agree with him that under the present system
medical testimony, important as it is, can be practically nullified.
Wharton, in his magnificent work on the law of evidence says,
that originally expert testimony was called in to supply to the
court and jury information about scientific facts, not within their
knowledge, to aid them in arriving at conclusions of fact. The
modern theoryof expert testimony, as opinion based upon a hypothetical case propounded by a litigant, seems to be an outgrowth
of practice. In view of the increasing importance of medical
testimony as a necessary aid in the administration of justice; a
change in the present methods of introduicing medical evidence
would seem imperative.
WHY STUDY THE CIVIL LAW
The territorial legislature of Michigan abrogated the "Customs
of Paris" in force in that territory while under French Dominion.
The Constitution of our state declares the common law in force
in the Territory of Wisconsin, and not repugnant thereto, to remain in force until superseded by legislative enactment. The
Supreme Court of Wisconsin has declared the term "common
law" to mean the common law of England as it existed in the
original thirteen American Colonies at the time of the Revolution.
It would seem then that the study of the civil law is a matter of
utter indifference to a lawyer in Wisconsin. Yet such is not
true.
The cardinal principles of justice are unchangeable. The
Justinian Code which survived the Roman Empire as the foundation of the modern civilization in Europe has furnished the
fundamental principles of American private law. The maxims of
Ulpian, "According to the law of nature all men are equal" and
"By nature all men are free" sound the keynote of our institutions. Frequent references to the civil lay are made in the
reports of American and English courts, either to seek the reason for a rule or to support their decisions. Unable to keep
abreast of the growing needs of new-conditions the common law
courts have long ago reached over into the civil law for basic
principles.
The civil law as a system of Jurisprudence is grounded essentially on the experience of ages. The Justinian Code is composed of a body of principles which were found in the law of all
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nations from time immemorial. The strict jus civile, the positive
law of the Twelve Tables, was applicable only to the citizens of
Rome. It grew more and more inadequate as the Roman eagle
spread over farther lands. Recurrent suits between citizens and
foreigner's, and between foreigners of diverse nationalities,
necessitated a special tribunal to adjudicate these controversies.
The Praetors, untrammeled by positive law, administered justice
according to their own notions of natural equity. They observed
that certain laws were common to all nations. These laws were
summarized by the jurists under the name of jus gentium. The
Stoic philosophy of Greece had developed the idea of a natural
law, and with the enthusiastic reception of that- philosophy in
Rome, the idea of a jus naturale entirely transfused the theory of
the old positive law of early Rome. Laws of ancient civilizations,
perished long before, were thus enriched and expanded into a
magnificent system of law based on natural equity. The civil
law has ever since and in every age furnished principles which,
modified to meet new circumstances, have greatly contributed to
the real interests and welfare of modern society.
The methods by which justice is administered are subject to
constant fluctuations. By momentous reforms, England during
the past century ironed out many of the salient characteristics
of the common law. It was not pretended, however, to adopt the
tenets of the civil law. To be accurate, the common law was
brought closer to that common basis of justice that ought to inhere in all systems of jurisprudence whether of Germanic or
Roman origin. It must be conceded that the civil law more nearly
approaches an ideal system, to attain which is the purpose underlying modern reforms in procedure.
The crowning achievement of codifying the correlated principles of the civil law is a monument to the Roman genius for
organization. Codification admittedly tends to secure uniformity.
The conflict of the decisions throughout common law jurisdictions
is severely criticised. In the day of Bacon and Coke there was
a strong controversy whether decisions should furnish precedents
to govern later cases or whether decisions should merely illustrate a system of "Rules" as proposed by Bacon. Coke's system
of Reports prevailed; and although the maxims of Equity supplied the deficiencies of the common law, yet the innate vice of
that system remained. Under the doctrine of stare decisis one
wrong decision entails a continuation in ertor until that decision
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has been overruled, while under the civil law one court is nowise
bound by decisions of another. The civil law provides a norm
and the decisions thereunder must necessarily tend to conform
thereto, but the common law must strive for uniformity from a
maze of conflicting decisions.
The admirable uniformity created by the Justinian Code is a
universal need today. An international code of laws, compatible
with sovereignty, is an aspiration of the idealist. Codification
has taken firm root in England. The project of codifying existing law is a distinctly American problem. The feasibility of
codification, without effacing the limits of state jurisdiction in a
federal republic, is being demonstrated. The uniformity of law
in European countries today, where formerly a great diversity
of law existed, bears eloquent testimony to past achievements.
The civil law as a fountain of basic principles has not been
exhausted. The characteristic stability and uniformity of the civil
law is still a desirable end. The splendid example of codification
of the Justinian Code has not been surpassed to this day. When
the Justinian Code has ceased to be a source of inspiration, then
only can it be said that the study of the civil law may be safely
ignored by the analytical student of the law.
JOSEPH WITMER,

Editor.

